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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Efficient productivity often relies upon the matching of managerial skills and the 
resources available for production. Often, poor production outcomes can be attributed to those 
not directly involved in the production: the managers. Similarly, poor results in professional 
sports are often attributed to the men and women who never play a minute of a game: the 
managers/coaches. Managers are routinely blamed for performance and are often the first change 
an owner or a club will make to improve results. This paper will attempt to determine the 
performance effects of changing a club’s manager in soccer’s English Premier League (EPL). 
Further, this paper will attempt to determine the length of time an EPL manager can reasonably 
expect to remain employed by his club based upon his and the team’s characteristics. Utilizing 
panel data from seasons spanning the EPL era, we attempt to analyze if clubs act rationally or 
emotionally in deciding to terminate their managers.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Barclay’s Premier League in England (EPL) is the equivalent of the NFL to the 
United Kingdom and in a growing sense the rest of the world. As such, managerial positions in 
the English Premier League are some of the most grueling and scrutinized jobs coaches 
undertake. These highly influential individuals are the leaders of their team and are expected to 
produce results that satisfy the owners, the players and the fans. 
The pressure associated with these positions is ever expanding. As clubs search for new 
ways to push forward financially, the coaching staff is expected to do the same on the field. 
Having a position of great influence over the make up of the team and having the final say in 
setting up for each game, means that coaches who do not produce will be removed. Even though 
they prepare and organize the team for every game, the coaches, the men who never play a 
minute are the ones who usually let go first. It is wide spread belief that if the team is not 
performing up to standard then a coaching change is needed.  
The question should be asked, does changing your manager really better your shot at a 
title? Intuition says poor performance usually leads to a change in management, as does a 
decrease in attendance when fan support begins to waiver but firing your manager should have a 
negative impact on the team. Thus, we expect to find that teams at the bottom end of the table are 
more likely to change their manager than a team at the top of the table, everything else held 
constant.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
 
When considering the ability to analyze managerial change within a firm it is very 
difficult to create metrics to measure firm dynamics. In sports however it is far easier to gain a 
sense of the performance levels associated with a club (Koning 2003). Data from sports teams 
offers us this opportunity to measure and quantify the effect of coaching changes. One of the 
drawbacks is the limited number of opponents possible when comparing a soccer league to a 
market segment. Also, turnover among players acts much in the same way as turnover of office 
subordinates. Likewise, changes in ownership and directors will be viewed as a proxy for 
changes in a firm’s senior management team. Being able to evaluate sports data can give us an 
insight into the ideas behind why an underperforming club or firm would change their manager 
and the short-run effects of said changes. 
 In terms of sports, soccer appears to have a higher turnover rate than American sports due 
to the perceived share of control a soccer manager has compared to a baseball or basketball 
coach (Audas, Dobson, and Goddard 1999). In soccer, coaches are generally relied upon more to 
have the final say in player acquisitions, player releases, and day-to-day operations not generally 
associated with a head coach in America. The expected result from this increased share of power 
is greater reward when things go right or a larger portion of the blame when things go wrong. In 
essence the manager is the first to be praised and the first to go when performance changes, as 
previous research shows (1999). 
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One of the difficult aspects of sports economics is determining what the firm’s, or in this 
case, the club’s ultimate goal is. As stated by the Premier League, “The principal objective of the 
Premier League is to stage the most competitive and compelling league with world class players 
and, through the equitable distribution of broadcast and commercial revenues, to enable clubs to 
develop so that European competition is a realistic aim and, once there, they are playing at a 
level where they can compete effectively.” The league gives a good starting point, but 
determining an individual club’s goals is far more difficult when compared to the goals of the 
league. With goals set by: the owners, the coaches, players, media and the fans, determining 
success and failure are always subjective and usually biased.    
In terms of viewership the EPL is the largest grossing domestic league based upon the 
number of unique viewers. According to the Premier League website, with 212 different 
territories represented, TV contracts with 80 different broadcasters, and with expansion into new 
countries almost every year, the EPL is the fastest growing league for aggregate unique viewers. 
With centralized revenues exceeding £1.2 billion in 2011 the EPL is one of the largest grossing 
sport governing bodies in the world. TV along with other forms of revenue is allotted equally 
before and after the season to each team. However postseason rewards are given based upon a 
teams final table position. For example, at the end of the 2012 season the 1st place team will 
receive around £16 million while the 20th placed team will receive £800,000, as reported by the 
Daily Mail. The disparity between first place and last place in terms of the total money received 
from the league over the entirety of the season is nearly £35 million. These vast differences in 
compensation can and do alter the competitive balance in the league.  
Realistically the goal for each club varies. For example Manchester United Football Club 
and Everton F.C. have both been in the Premier League since its inception. However, United has 
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a much higher revenue stream, more of a global standing and has challenged for the Premier 
League title and the Champions League title every year since 1992. Everton on the other-hand 
has a much smaller budget, considerably smaller revenue stream, and smaller goals such as 
finishing in the top four of the league and qualifying for the Champions League, as much for the 
prestige but more for the lucrative cash incentives provided. Manchester United sees them selves 
as a global brand building short successes every year by maintaining their status; where as 
Everton’s long run goal is to be a Champions League mainstay but short run success is 
qualification.  
The goals set forth by each club vary based upon the funding they have available to them 
and by in large, many clubs outside of the top 5 do not have significant amounts of funding 
outside of the money set aside by the league. Without available cash from the owner(s) and other 
possible outside funding from European competitions and lending institutions, challenging for a 
Premier League title has become limited to the top teams who continually qualify for the 
Champions League. The amount of money available to the Champions League teams creates a 
virtual oligarchy atop the Premier League and stifles competition for the league title. 
To expand on the Champions League, the top 3 teams in England qualify automatically 
and the 4th plays in a playoff to get into the group phase. At each qualifying round teams receive 
a payment which progressively increases through each phase. Qualification for the group phase 
is an automatic payout of around £15 million with qualification for the knock out stages being a 
second payment of around £20 million (Johnson). Total prize money from the Champions 
League, cumulatively, is around £50 million for the winner. In comparison, the fifth place team 
in England qualifies for the Europa League, the secondary international club competition in 
Europe, but if they were to win it they would only receive around £10 million in prize money 
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(Train). This financial gap between international tournaments and domestic leagues creates a 
disparity between the mega-rich oligarchs who continually qualify for the Champions League 
and the minnows that scrap for positions, hoping for a taste of European money. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
DATA & METHODS 
 
 
 
The major sources of data for this project were acquired from a soccer database website, 
soccerbase.com, that gathers information from each major league across Europe. Also the 
official Premier League website, premierleague.com, supplied a vast amount of data. All data 
begins with the season starting in 1992, the year the Premier League was established and runs 
through 2010, the last completed season at the time of this paper. Each data point is specific to a 
team and a year. The variables measuring performance include final table position, where they 
team finishes the season, i.e. 1, 2, 3, etc. Also measuring performance is points per game, where 
three points is earned for a win, one point for a draw and zero for a loss. Other performance 
factors include goals per game and goals against per game, counting the number of goals scored 
divided by the number of games placed and the same for number of goals conceded during a 
season. To measure a club’s history and the level of prestige associated with each club, trophy 
history measures the number of trophies, up to the given year, and counts the League titles, 
European Cups, UEFA Cups, FA Cups, and League Cup championships. Average attendance, 
used as both a dependent and independent variable, is a control for club size where more 
prestigious clubs tend to have bigger stadiums. Also included in the test are several discrete 
dummy variables. For example offseason change and in-season change both count if the 
manager left the club either in the prior offseason or during the season. Other discrete 
variables comprise of teams competing in a European league competition, such as the 
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Champions League or Europa League. The last discrete variable “Big Four” consist of 
Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool and Manchester United; the teams that dominated the top four spots 
in the league for nearly a decade. Also, within the study 134 different coaches changes took 
place. 
The following models were tested: 
• Final table position as a linear function of goals per game, goals against per game, positiont-1, 
offseason change, in-season coaching change and trophy history. 
• Average attendance as a linear regression function of positiont-1, goals per game, goals 
against per game, offseason change, in-season change and trophy history.  
• A logit model with coaching change as a function of position, positiont-1, goals per game, 
goals against per game, trophy history and average attendance. 
• A multinomial logit model with the four coaching change options as a function of position, 
positiont-1, goals per game, goals against per game, goals per gamet-1, goals against per  
gamet-1, trophy history and average attendance. 
• An ordinal logit model split into three categories for final table position as a function of 
preseason coaching change, in-season change, postseason change, post-1, goals per game, 
goals against per game, trophy history and attendance. 
• The Cox model and Kaplan-Meier are both survival analysis models. Coaching tenure was 
measured by the number of games coached as well as the number of years the tenure lasted in 
each model. The independent variables associated with each model include, age, nationality, 
whether they were English, Scottish or European, number of teams coached over their career, 
whether or not they coached the “Big 4”, and the variables of interest were either average 
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points per game or the difference in the current point per game compared to the tenure 
average points per game. 
Tests were run for heteroskedasticity and a White’s Correction was run on each necessary model 
with the detection of heteroskedasticity. 
 
Figure 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Position 10.6709 5.8888 1 22 
Wins 14.4213 5.3252 1 29 
Draws 10.4352 2.8770 3 18 
Loses 14.4213 5.1031 0 29 
Goals For 50.5777 13.3140 20 103 
Goals Against 50.5777 12.6265 15 100 
Goals PG 1.3074 .3429 .53 2.71 
Goals APG 1.3073 .3230 .39 2.38 
Points 52.7777 15.3988 11 95 
Points PG 1.3645 .3970 .2984 2.5 
Avg Attendance 31228.47 12221.84 8405 75835 
Total Attendance 601121.8 229385.9 176505 1440857 
Trophy History 9.7279 9.7427 0 40 
Promoted .1398 .3473 0 1 
Preseason Change .0259 .1592 0 1 
In-Season Change .2545 .4361 0 1 
Postseason Change .1506 .3581 0 1 
Europe .2279 .4200 0 1 
Big Four .1968 .3981 0 1 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
 
The turnover rate of managers and coaches in professional sports looks to be on the rise 
to many spectators. With short-term financial incentives increasing from lucrative deals such as: 
TV contracts, merchandising and image rights, along with other sources of funding, professional 
sport franchises need to win at all cost in the short-run to maintain a competitive advantage.  
 
Assumption 1: Intuitively, the expectation is that coaching changes will negatively impact team  
performance, subsequently lowering their final position in the table. 
 
Assumption 2: Alternatively attendance should not be affected by coaching changes. Intuition  
says that fans come to see players play matches not coaches on the touchline and 
as such, attendance figures should not be affected. 
 
Assumption 3: In the multinomial logit model, four outcomes are possible: no coaching changes,  
preseason changes, in-season changes, and postseason changes. Here we expect 
goals for and against as well as final table position to be significant when 
determining which variables lead to coaching changes. 
 
Assumption 4: The ordinal logit model determines the effects of each independent variable on  
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three dependent categorical variables. The dependent variable is three ordered 
categories, teams finishing 1-5, teams finishing 6-15 and teams finishing 16-20 in 
each season. The expectation for the model is that the top category of teams, 1-5, 
and the bottom category of teams, 16-20, will be affected by coaching changes. 
 
Assumption 5: The hazard model is used to predict the length of time a manager will remain  
in-charge of a club from the time he is hired. The expectation is that managers 
who perform at or above the baseline points per game measure will increase their 
tenure as well as the number of games coached.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
FINDINGS 
 
 
 
MODEL #1 
This model was run to test the relationship between a team’s final position at the end of 
the season and the effects of the three coaching change variables. The null hypothesis was one of 
no relationship; the theory was that coaching changes would have a negative correlation towards 
team performance, ceteris paribus. 
As shown in figure 4.1 we do not find any significance between our variables of interest, 
the different coaching changes, and the regressand. According to the ordinary least squares 
model, neither in-season nor off-season changes are statistically significant when measuring a 
team’s final position in the league table. The signs of all other variables are as expected. When 
comparing the previous year’s final position to the current year’s final position we do find a 
positive relationship. The expectation is that teams will finish in relatively similar positions from 
season to season, all other things constant, and that is why the coefficient is relatively small. 
Also with three teams being relegated and promoted each season we expect the coefficient to be 
positive due to the fact that the same three teams are changing each season. Also, as expected, 
when goals per game increase one’s final position moves towards first place and as goals against 
per game increase one’s final position moves towards last place. Average attendance however is 
positive and the expected sign was negative. The assumption is that stadium size increases with 
the size of the club and as clubs increase in size it tends to finish better in the table. 
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The R squared in this situation is not surprising. When determining a team’s final table 
position goals scored and goals against are going to be highly correlated. As is obvious, when 
more goals scored and fewer given up, more games are won. These two variables account for a 
large amount of variation in the model and are both high statistically significant. 
Figure 5.1 OLS Position Model 
Variable Coefficient T-Value 
Intercept 7.432423 5.79 
Positiont-1 .0140317 .34 
Goals Per Game* -8.488782* -.13.03* 
Goals Against Per Game* 9.912721* 17.32* 
In-Season Change .3228055 1.03 
Off-Season Changet-1 -.3531479 -.97 
Trophy History -.0197572 -1.10 
Average Attendance* .0000445* 3.10* 
R2 = .8238 
 
Here we don’t find any evidence to suggest that coaching changes correlate to changes in 
performance levels. That is to say firing your coach does not statistically increase or decrease the 
team’s final position in the league. From the aforementioned table all indications suggests that 
final position is determined by the average number of goals scored and conceded as well as the 
size of the club, controlled for by average attendance. The conclusions gathered here do not 
show any significance between firing the coach and the performance of the team leading us to 
believe that changing coaches in the EPL does not significantly affect a club’s position at the end 
of the season. 
Multicollinearity expected to be an issue with this model. One of the checks run for 
multicollinearity was a correlation matrix. In the matrix both goals per game and goals against 
per game had a collinearity rating greater than .80, showing positive correlation between the 
variables. Next, both goals per game and goals against per game were run as dependent variables 
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in OLS models, with the independent variables from the Position model remaining the same. In 
both models where goals per game and goals against per game were the dependent variable 
nearly every independent variable used again was significant. Repeating the idea that 
multicollinearity is an issue. However without any variable to replace goals per game or goals 
against per game they will remain in the model since they are the best available option. 
 
MODEL #2 
The second model is designed to test the influence of in-season and off-season changes 
on average attendance. The null hypothesis was that of no relationship, the rationale behind the 
theory for the second model is that the amount of criticism a coach receives from both supporters 
and the uproar caused in the media when a team performs poorly could leading to a change in 
management. 
As shown in Figure 4.2 there once again is no significance between coaching changes 
and the regressand. Here using ordinary least squares model, we find there is no statistical 
significance for either in-season or off-season coaching changes, ceteris paribus. Both variables 
are positively correlated and show very small increase in average attendance, but as previously 
stated neither is statistically significant. Also insignificant is the final position from the previous 
year. On the other hand goals per game and goals against per game are highly statistically 
significant. As expected, when goals per game increases attendance increases. As goals against 
per game increases, attendance figures fall. Similarly, as trophies are won and trophy history 
grows, attendance will increase, ceteris paribus. 
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The R squared seems reasonable at 49.57 and is expected with the variables present. As 
anticipated goals per game and goals against per game, along with trophy history, were the only 
significant variables. All are significant at the 99% level.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 OLS Average Attendance Model 
 
Variable Coefficient T-Value 
Intercept 23423.02 4.21 
Positiont-1 -129.5638 -.96 
Goals Per Game* 10034.51* 3.94* 
Goals Against Per Game* -6533.702* -3.06* 
In-Season Change 329.5961 0.28 
Offseason Changet-1 627.331 .52 
Trophy History* 434.0196* 6.06* 
R2 = .4957 
  
In this model we don’t find any statistical differences in average attendance when a 
change in coaches occurs. These findings lead us to believe that coaching changes do not affect 
attendance. One idea generated from the attendance model is that teams who rely on attendance 
revenue will typically have a shorter time frame that they will allow coaches to underperform 
before a change occurs. Coincidentally, attendance figures may actually improve once the coach 
changes, regardless of whether or not the team actually improves. This can be seen with 
Blackburn Rovers in this current season, 2011-12. As the team’s performance has dropped and 
the club has been in the relegation zone nearly the entire season, attendance figures have 
declined as fans boycott games until the coach, who they believe to be the root of the poor 
performances, is terminated. So far this season the manager has yet to be fired and it is almost 
certain the team will be relegated. 
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MODEL #3 
 The third model consisted of a logit and multinomial logit function with coaching change 
as a function of current and prior performance variables. The logit and multinomial logit tests are 
designed to determine which variables significantly affect the chance a coaching change occurs. 
In each model coaching change, a discrete variable, is the dependent variable and as such OLS is 
no longer appropriate.  
 In the logit model the previous years position and average attendance are the two 
variables of significance. Surprisingly the previous years position influence is negative. Here we 
would not have expected the likelihood of a change to decrease as position increases. The other 
variable of significance, average attendance is also negative. Here the expected sign is correct. 
We would expect increases in average attendance to decrease the likelihood of a coaching 
change. The logit does not seem to be the best model here. As shown in previous models we 
would expect goals per game and goals against per game to be significant as well. Instead we 
will focus more attention on the results from the multinomial model. 
Figure 5.3 Marginal Effects on Coaching Change in the Logit Model 
Variable Marginal Effects Z-Score 
Position .0719977 1.29 
Positiont-1* -.1214777* -3.09* 
Goals Per Game -1.040753 -1.47 
Goals Against Per Game .5076062 .60 
Trophy History .0057535 .32 
Average Attendance* -.0000241* -1.65* 
 
 The possible coaching change outcomes of the multinomial model include, in order: no 
change, preseason change, in-season change, and postseason change. For preseason changes, 
figure 4.5, we don’t find anything of interest regarding manager’s turnover likelihood. As 
expected the only variables of significance are the previous season’s final position as well as 
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previous season’s goals per game and goals against per game. As seen in previous models, off-
season changes are due to the previous year’s performance and a manager is .9% more likely to 
change for each position their team drops in the league.  
 For in-season changes we find that the previous season’s final table position, the current 
season’s goals per game and goals against per game, plus the previous season’s goals against per 
game rate are all statistically significant. As the previous season’s position increases it leads to a 
1.75% decrease in the likelihood of a change. This is further proof that teams finishing higher in 
the table are less likely to change managers. 
As goals per game increases by 1 goal per game, on average the likelihood of changing 
coaches decreases by 31.1%. Likewise as goals against per game increases by 1 goal per game 
the likelihood of changing in-season increases by 29.46%. Goals per game from the previous 
season are significant and the likelihood of a change decreases by 21.28% as the current rate 
drops by one goal per game.  
Lastly with postseason changes we find that the difference in current final position versus 
the previous season is significant and as the team’s performance decreases the likelihood of a 
change increases by .09%. Similarly with goals against per game, as performance from the 
current to previous season declines by 1 goal per game the likelihood of a change increases by 
nearly 24%. Somewhat surprising is that average attendance is very close to being significant 
and shows that as attendance falls the likelihood of a change increases. 
Figure 5.4 Marginal Effects on Preseason Coaching Changes in the Multinomial Model 
 
Variable Marginal Effects Z-Score 
Position -.0001574 -.18 
Positiont-1 .0006765 1.03 
Positiont-2* -.0096863* -1.94* 
Goals Per Game -.0015612 -.12 
Goals Against Per Game .0014658 .09 
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Goals Per Gamet-1* -.007956* -2.01* 
Goals Against Per Gamet-1* -.0057846* -2.00* 
Trophy History .0000653 .23 
Average Attendance 1655.9160 1.39 
 
 In Figure 4.4 we notice that each one of the marginal effects outcomes that is statistically 
significant the percent change in the likelihood of a change is less than one percent. One of the 
reasons this is believed to be as such is that most teams do not seem to make rational decisions 
when firing coaches. In addition, most coaching changes do not occur during the preseason. The 
preseason is expected to be calm in terms of managerial turnover as teams are preparing for the 
upcoming season. We don’t normally expect to see much turnover here and as such changes 
appear to be made using short-term data and not based off an entire seasons results. Favoring the 
idea that changes are not rational decisions. Each statistically significant factor for why a coach 
would be changed in the preseason changes the likelihood by less than 1%. This leads to the 
conclusion that there must be another reason why coaching changes occur not included in the 
current model.  
Figure 5.5 Marginal Effects on In-Season Coaching Changes in the Multinomial Model 
 
Variable Marginal Effects Z-Score 
Position -.0020643 -0.21 
Positiont-1* -.0175094* -2.73* 
Positiont-2 .1075218 0.61 
Goals Per Game* -.3111143* -2.44* 
Goals Against Per Game* .2946016* 2.04* 
Goals Per Gamet-1 -.0521364 -.68 
Goals Against Per Gamet-1* -.2128964* -8.08* 
Trophy History .001375 0.47 
Average Attendance 1424.1036 -1.27 
 
In-Season changes are not too different from preseason changes in terms of the 
significant variables effects. For example, goals against per game plays a huge role determining 
the likelihood of a coaching change. Over the entirety of the table as goals against per game 
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increase by 1 goal, on average, the percent likelihood of a coaching change increases by nearly 
29.5%. Once again this shows that poor performance can cause a managerial change but we have 
yet to see any significance from the change. 
Figure 5.6 Marginal Effects on Postseason Coaching Changes in the Multinomial Model 
 
Variable Marginal Effects Z-Score 
Position* .0174023* 3.23* 
Positiont-1* -.0084946* -2.32* 
Positiont-2 .0585411 0.65 
Goals Per Game .0526009 0.81 
Goals Against Per Game* -.1963113* -2.38* 
Goals Per Gamet-1* -.0496549* -1.67* 
Goals Against Per Gamet-1* -.087489* -4.78* 
Trophy History -.0001832 -0.09 
Average Attendance -794.7547t -1.50t 
 
For postseason changes, even though it falls just outside of the ninety-percent confidence 
interval, decreases in average attendance do tend to increase the likelihood of a change in the 
offseason. Once again we find that team performance is the main component taken into 
consideration when changing a manager. Here as goals against per game increase by one goal, 
the likelihood of a change increases by 19.6%. However this does not entirely explain why 
coaching changes occur after the season. 
 
MODEL #4 
 The fourth model is an ordinal logit model with final table position separated into three 
categories, teams 1-5, teams 6-15 and teams 16-20, as a function of positiont-1, goals per game, 
goals against per game, trophy history, average attendance, in-season change and previous off-
season change. The ordinal logit is designed to test the effects of each independent variable on a 
group of dependent variables; in this case the final table position groupings are the dependents. 
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The goal of ordinal logit model is to determine if different variables affect specific groups in the 
final table. 
 Here the final table position is separated into 3 ordered groups of the first 5 teams, the 
middle 10 and last 5 teams. Once again we don’t find any significance towards any of the 
groupings for coaching changes. Neither in-season nor off-season changes affect the 
performance of the team. The only variable that is of any significance is trophy history relative to 
the top five and bottom five teams. The expected signs for each performance variable is correct, 
position, positiont-1, goals per game and goals against per game. Strangely trophy history and 
average attendance were negative. Both coaching change variables were negative as expected 
though. With an R2 of .1817 we find that this model is acceptable but does not explain a great 
amount of variation.  
Figure 5.7 Ordered Logistic Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Z-Score 
Positiont-1 .0375837 1.20 
Goals Per Game* -1.065202* -1.89* 
Goals Against Per Game* 1.431225* 2.85* 
Trophy History* -.04846* -2.70* 
Average Attendance -.000017 -1.20 
In-Season Change -.1563029 -0.55 
Previous Off-Season Change -.3811264 -1.04 
Psuedo R2 = .1800 
Cut 1 = -1.657335 Cut 2 = 1.025353 
 
Figure 5.8 Marginal Effects Outcome for teams 1-5 
Variable Coefficient Z-Score 
Positiont-1 -.0066715 -1.20 
Goals Per Game* .1890586* 1.90* 
Goals Against Per Game* -.2540588* -2.78* 
Trophy History* .0086022* 2.67* 
Average Attendance 1218.3549 1.18 
In-Season Change .0283461 0.45 
Previous Off-Season Change .072276 0.97 
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The varying goals set forth by club presidents and owners are typically the same in 
similar sections of the league. The top tier in England, the top 4 or 5, typically challenge for the 
league title and for European success as well. These clubs are the some of the biggest clubs in 
England as well as the world, including Manchester United, Arsenal, Liverpool plus nouveau 
riche Chelsea and more recently Manchester City. At the top of the table we typically find that 
the teams are competing for multiple trophies and the managers are required to continually 
maintain the team at the highest level by qualifying for the lucrative Champions League spots. 
Within the data coaching changes are not found to have any effect on performance, attendance, 
or more specifically teams that finish in the top four spots. As shown by the first two least 
squared model regressions analyzing performance and average attendance, the variables for 
coaching changes which occurs in-season or during the off-season do not significantly affect 
either model. The ordinal logit model however, measures the effect each independent variable 
has on the specific category represented in the model. In this model it was again found to be that 
teams finishing in the top five were less likely to change their coach. Seeing that it is highly 
unlikely for coaching changes to take place within the top four position in the table due to poor 
long-term performance results and poor attendance, it is far more likely that coaching changes 
are being made here by owners and senior management for emotional or short-run performance 
related causes. Typically what we have seen in recent years is that Champions League glory is 
the ultimate goal for clubs at this level and failure to achieve success in the league as well as in 
European competition simultaneously can lead to a coaching change.  
Chelsea is a prime example of a top-level team that consistently qualifies for the 
Champions League. They have won numerous league titles and domestic trophies in the Premier 
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League era since their new billionaire owner took over the club and flooded it with cash. Before 
Roman Abromovich took over the club in 2003, the club could compete for the Champions 
League spots but never assumed qualification. With a huge influx of expensive new players in 
2004, Chelsea became a powerhouse in England. With over £100 million spent on new players 
and new coaches brought in as well, the new goal set forth by the owner was the Champions 
League title or bust. Since then Chelsea has not finished outside of the top 4 places; having won 
the Premier League three times, finishing second 4 times, third once, and fourth once in 2004 
(the first year of the Abromovich era). Throughout these last eight seasons Chelsea has had 4 
seasons when coaches were fired but has had eight coaches in the last nine years. The mean 
performance standard throughout this time period was set by the owner and if the coach did not 
maintain that mean level and progress at least to the next round of the Champions League, when 
compared to the previous season, he was fired.  
The exact opposite can be seen at Manchester United. Here Sir Alex Ferguson was hired 
in 1986 and has just completed his 25th year in change at United. Ferguson was hired and raised 
the performance standards of Manchester United each season until he won his first title in 1992, 
unlike with Chelsea. Ferguson was given six years to take a middle of the road United squad and 
turn them into the most dominant team the Premier League has seen. Winning twelve titles in the 
Premier League era, 18 seasons. Also Manchester United has not finished outside of the top 3 in 
that same time period. Sir Alex Ferguson changed the culture at United and created a new 
performance level and has been given full control, so long as he maintains his current level 
throughout each season. 
Figure 5.9 Marginal Effects Outcome for teams 6-15 
Variable Coefficient Z-Score 
Positiont-1 .00099 0.83 
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Goals Per Game -.0280595 -1.02 
Goals Against Per Game .0377012 1.06 
Trophy History -.0012765 -1.05 
Average Attendance -4912.9165 -0.80 
In-Season Change -.0053145 -0.42 
Previous Off-Season Change -.0192438 -0.65 
 
Moving down into the middle of the table, these teams typically rotate between the sixth 
through the fifteenth spot. Here we have the perennial churning of the teams to challenge for 
Europa League spots, domestic cup competitions and the teams hoping to stay above the 
relegation fight. These teams typically set goals of moving into the top half of the table, 
maintaining their current position, challenging for domestic cups (FA and League Cup) and the 
occasional European spot when one of the top five slip up. These teams are typically run more 
like American sports franchises in that they try and breakeven financially each year while 
maximizing performance levels. As previously noted the variables not being controlled for 
include player talent levels, player transfers and ownership changes along with many other 
omitted variables that go into determining a team’s status. We typically find that teams hover 
around a certain performance mean and coaching changes occur when the team either falls or 
rises for a considerable amount of time around the mean. When the team’s performance falls we 
find coaches being fired, and conversely when teams stay above their mean performance level 
bigger clubs pick up their managers. This cycle of coaching changes typically keeps middle of 
the table clubs in their respective positions unless one team has an unusually good or bad year. 
As seen in the OLS regressions on performance and attendance there is no statistical significance 
showing that firing one’s manager changes either dependent variable significantly, leading us to 
believe seasonal averages are not the best predictors for determining managerial turnover in 
terms of percent likelihoods. Seasonal data seems to be considered long-run data for most teams. 
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Many of the decisions determining managerial change, player acquisitions, trades and releases 
typically are based on short-run data. This typically encompasses a run of bad form where a team 
does poorly for a month or two, not the entire nine-month season. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Marginal Effects Outcome for teams 16-20 
Variable Coefficient Z-Score 
Positiont-1 .0056815 1.20 
Goals Per Game* -.1610261* -1.87* 
Goals Against Per Game* .2163576* 2.83* 
Trophy History* -.0073257* -2.72* 
Average Attendance -1169.9435 -1.20 
In-Season Change -.0230316 -0.56 
Previous Off-Season Change -.0530232 -1.14 
 
Lastly at the very bottom of the table we find teams in 16 and 17 in addition to the 
relegation teams 18, 19 and 20. Since the bottom three teams are relegated to the next league, the 
Championship division, we no longer have data for them unless they reappear in the Premiership. 
This churning of teams at the bottom typically results in similar teams being relegated and 
promoted quite often. This allows for them to bounce back and forth for a number of years until 
their mean performance level either improves enough for them to remain in the Premiership or 
falls and keeps them perennially in the Championship, or worse, relegates them to lower leagues.  
Owners and club directors at this level typically plan to either increase the clubs 
infrastructure in terms of both players and stadia or choose to remain at their current level as a 
Championship level club. When clubs choose to fight for survival in the Premiership we 
typically see an overhaul of the playing squad, improvements to facilities and/or sometimes 
changes in the coaching staff. Failure to stay up typically results in the manager being sacked 
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either before the season is over or soon thereafter. However, teams that choose not to spend the 
influx of Premier League money immediately but instead invest it in the youth of the club 
typically do not have turnover rates like the previously mentioned clubs. These clubs typically 
have more long-term oriented plans built around financial stability and in doing so keep their 
managers longer.  
 
MODEL #5 
 In the Hazard models we are able to test several different factors associated with 
determining the length of time a manager remains employed after the hiring date. First the 
Kaplan-Meier model is a graphical representation of the length of time a manager remains 
tenured with a club. It shows the percentage of coaches still tenured after each season. The 
second model, the Cox model, measures the affects of each independent variable on each coach’s 
tenure. Also the Cox model takes into account the length of the tenure and controls for when a 
coach was hired and leaves. 
We tested the length of employment in tenured years and the number of games coached 
as the dependent variables. The independent variables included age, nationality, number of teams 
coached, if they coached any of the “Big Four” (Arsenal, Chelsea, Liverpool, Manchester 
United) and the variables of interest, either current season points per game or the difference in 
their current points per game minus their average points per game over their tenure. The variable 
for difference in ppg versus tenure ppg is statistically significant in each Cox hazard model and 
is positive. As expected when the current points per game increased in comparison to the average 
over the tenure, we typically see coaches last longer. Logically this makes sense. Coaches who 
perform better than average receive contract extensions as well building goodwill within the 
organization, which will help them if their average ppg dips below their tenure’s average.
previously stated Sir Alex Ferguson is an excellent example of a coach who raised the standard 
at a club and has maintained an unprecedented level of success over hi
 The chart listed to the right is
5.11, a Kaplan-Meier survival estimate 
displaying the difference between tenure time 
for English managers and European 
continental managers. The graph indicates 
that European managers typically don’t last as 
many seasons in their tenure as English 
managers. The first steep drop occurs for both English and Continental managers around the 
second season where it levels off of a year for English but continues to drop for the European 
managers.  
Figure 5.12 Cox Model for Tenure by Number of Games
Variable 
Age 
Scottish 
European* 
Number of Teams Coached 
Points Per Game Differential* 
 
However, when analyzing the Cox model results 
games coached and measuring the 
positive and significant. Showing that in the
improves your longevity, compared to English, 
Cox model one assumption is that European managers
 
 
25
s tenure of 26 years.
, Figure 
 
Coefficient Z-
.0150277 
.0377857 
1.581507* 2.26
-.1122099 -
-2.369321* -
for the tenure based upon the number of 
points per game differential, we find that being European is 
 Cox model being a European coach actually 
where as the Kaplan-Meier says otherwise. In the 
 in England who are perceived to have
 As 
 
Score 
.32 
.06 
* 
0.95 
4.92* 
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performed above average have the option of returning to the continent to possibly a bigger salary 
and/or a more prestigious club. Some of the drop off in the Kaplan-Meier can be explained by 
this siphoning off of international talent from the English league. One observation we don’t see 
though is English coaches moving abroad. It is quite rare to see an English coach take a first 
division job in another country, while it is not rare to see a high profile Spaniard, Portuguese, 
Italian, Dutch or other continental European manager take a job in a foreign league. For this 
reason we expect over performing foreign managers in the UK to either return to their native 
league or another continental league for a more prestigious and often higher paying job. This 
assumption is inline with the idea that as the difference in ppg-ppg tenure becomes positive we 
see an increase in longevity of the coaches. But as shown buy the Kaplan-Meier, English coaches 
still tend to have a slightly longer tenure than other continental European coaches in the EPL.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
After a close analysis of the managers in the Barclays Premier League we can conclude 
that there is no statistical link between coaching change and the teams final position in the 
league. Similarly coaching change does not statistically affect average attendance. Also with the 
outcomes form the logit and multinomial models we come to the conclusion that seasonal data is 
not the best measure for determining coaching change. Using information over the last 18 years 
from the EPL and the different models to measure performance, attendance and tenure, the 
assumption is that the decision making process used for changing managers comes from short-
run data.  
From the literature and the results taken from the different models we find that rational 
decision-making process based upon season data no longer holds true. Managerial changes now 
appear to be short-run decisions that are made to appease owners and fan. As shown by the 
Chelsea F.C. case, the League was ownerships second priority and the Champions League was 
considered first. This oligarchy atop the Premier League has rendered long-term data irrelevant 
as managers are required to maintain the high performance standards associated with Champions 
League qualification. As shown by the Cox model it is short-run deviations from the tenure 
average that determine a managerial change now, not full seasons. 
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